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poverty intensity, to changes in the welfare distances between those poor of initially 
unequal welfare status, and/or to emerging disparities in welfare among those poor of 
initially similar welfare status. This note uses a general cost-of-inequality approach 
that decomposes the total change in poverty into a sum of indices of each of these 
three components. This decomposition can serve inter alia to integrate horizontal and 
vertical equity criteria in the poverty alleviation assessment of social and economic 
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This note presents a method that decomposes aggregate poverty differences into
movements in average poverty intensity and into changes in the vertical and hor-
izontal locations of the poor. Such aggregate poverty differences can be due, for
instance, to the effect migration, socio-economic mobility or growth. They can
also arise from the impact of a policy or when comparing the impact of two poli-
cies. In decomposing such poverty differences, we will account for the role of
three summary measures:
1. A measure of the differences in average poverty intensity, which captures
by how much the average poverty gap is affected by a distributional change.
This measure is distribution-insensitive across the poor. In a policy context,
it can be linked to popular targeting-accuracy indicators and related to rates
of beneﬁt leakages.
2. A measure of the vertical impact of the change. This captures the extent to
which vertical inequality in the distribution of poverty gaps is reduced by a
distributional change. For policy purposes, it can serve to assess the respect
of the vertical equity (VE) criterion, which demands a search for a reduction
in the welfare gaps that separate unequal individuals.
3. A measure of the horizontal impact of the distributional change. In a policy
context, this can be linked to the horizontal equity (HE) of the program. The
”classical” deﬁnition of HE indeed deﬁnes HE as ”the equal treatment of
equals” (see Musgrave (1959)), and there is horizontal inequity (HI) when
HE is violated.
The paper mainly shows how a simple combination of the above measures
can capture the trade-offs as well as the differences between indicators of average
poverty intensity and indicators of vertical and horizontal distances. This can be
useful for descriptive as well as for policy design purposes.
Section 2 outlines the basic methodology, Section 3 shows how to decompose
the total cost of inequality into vertical and horizontal contributions, and Section
4 illustrates brieﬂy the methodology using 1990 Tunisian household data.
22 The basic methodology
2.1 Poverty and inequality
Consider a vector y = (y1;y2;:::;yN;n1;n2;:::;nN) of living standards yh (in-
comes, for short) for a population of n =
PN
h=1 nh individuals. Let the poverty
line be denoted as z. Many of the common poverty measures can be expressed
in terms of poverty gaps, gh(z) = max(z ¡ yh;0), with g(z) the vector of these
poverty gaps.1 An important subset of these measures is the class of the FGT








where ® may be considered as a measure of aversion to inequality of poverty gaps.
In the manner of Atkinson (1970) for the measurement of social welfare and
inequality, letΓ®(g(z))bethe”equally-distributedequivalent(EDE)povertygap”,
viz, that poverty gap which, if assigned equally to all individuals, would produce
the same poverty measure as that generated by the actual distribution of poverty
gaps. Using (1), Γ®(g(z)) is given implicitly for ® > 0 as
Γ®(g(z)) = P®(g(z))
1
® for ® > 0:
Note that Γ1(g(z)) is the average poverty gap. For ® > 1, the more important the
difference between Γ®(g(z)) and Γ1(g(z)), the more unequal is the distribution
of poverty gaps. A natural measure of the cost of inequality is then given by:
C®(z) = Γ®(g(z)) ¡ Γ1(g(z)) for ® ¸ 1: (2)
Because C®(z) is given in per capita money-metric terms, it can be compared
directly to Γ1(g(z)). By (2), total poverty can be expressed as:
Γ®(g(z)) = Γ1(g(z)) + C®(z); ® ¸ 1: (3)
Note that it is only when the poverty gaps are equally distributed across the total
population that the cost of inequality becomes zero.
1 On this, see for instance Jenkins and Lambert (1997).
32.2 Poverty and targeting
Now consider a distributional change i which leads to an income distribution yi
with respective yi
h, gi
h(z), gi(z), and Ci
®(z). Assume that the per capita change
in income is given by ½i. The leakage of that change away from the poor is then
given for a change i by
L
i(z) = ½
i ¡ (Γ1(g(z)) ¡ Γ1(g
i(z)): (4)
The overall poverty impact is given by:
E
i
®(z) = Γ®(g(z)) ¡ Γ®(g
i(z)): (5)
Ei
®(z) can be thought of as a poverty-effectiveness measure of the change i. Using
(2 ), we can rewrite (5) as:
E
i
®(z) = ½ ¡ L
i(z) + C®(z) ¡ C
i
®(z): (6)
The poverty effectiveness of the change is thus a function of the average change
½i, the leakage to the non-poor Li(z), and the redistributive impact C®(z)¡Ci
®(z).
3 Horizontal and vertical effects
3.1 Horizontal effects
For any ﬁxed yh in pre-change y, let Ω(yh) denote the group of nh equals located
at point yh. Let °i


















Using the cost-of-inequality approach developed in Section 2, a natural measure







1(gh(z)) ¸ 0: (8)
In a policy context this can be interpreted as a local cost of HI at yh, generated
by post-policy inequality within the members of Ω(yh). An obvious next step is
4to aggregate the ´i
®(gh(z)) across the yh. Using population shares to do this2, an











Focus now on the distribution of the local EDE poverty gaps °i
®(gh(z)). Denote
this distribution as °i
®(z) = (°i
® (g1(z));:::;°i
® (gN(z));n1;:::;nN). The cost of
inequality with °i
®(z) is then given by:
C
¤i






® (z) can then be interpreted as the cost of inequality of a post-change distribu-
tion in which everyone is attributed his group-equivalent poverty gap. The vertical
effectiveness (or vertical equity VE) of that change can then be assessed through a




®(z) = C®(z) ¡ C
¤i
® (z): (11)
3.3 Overall poverty effectiveness
We then have:










Proof of Theorem 1. See appendix.
If we assume identical the per capita impact of two distributional changes, 1
and 2, such that ½1 = ½2, and if we denote ∆F = F 2 ¡ F 1, the difference in
poverty effectiveness between two distributional changes is given by:
∆E®(z) = ¡∆L(z) + ∆V®(z) ¡ ∆H®(z): (13)
Note that the formulation of (13) shows clearly the nature of the trade-off
that can emerge between leakage and vertical and horizontal effects. A change
2 See for instance Blackorby, Donaldson and Auersperg (1981), Musgrave (1990), Lambert
and Ramos (1997), Duclos and Lambert (2000), and Bibi (2002).
5can dominate another even with a higher leakage and a lower degree of vertical
effectiveness if it introduces less horizontal variability. When ® = 1, however,
V i
1(z) = Hi
1(z) = 0, which says that differences in poverty effectiveness depend
solely on differences in leakages away from the poor.
4 An application to Tunisia
We illustrate the use of the methodology presented above using a 1990 Tunisian
survey, ”Enquˆ ete Nationale sur le Budget et la Consommation des M´ enages 1990”
(National Household Budget and Expenditure Survey). This household survey is
multipurpose and provides information on consumption expenditures for various
items as well as extensive socio-demographic information on 7734 households.
The main anti-poverty program currently in force in Tunisia is based on the subsi-
dization of food consumption and thus on ”commodity targeting”.3 Government
expenditures on that program have been substantial throughout the 1980’s and the
1990’s, amounting to 4.1% of GDP in 1984, 2.9% in 1990, and 2% in 1995. We
compare the outcome of this program with that of an alternative one based on re-
gional targeting – involving the same overall budgetary outlay for the government
– in the manner of Kanbur (1987).4 For expositional simplicity, we ignore the
extent of deadweight losses under commodity targeting. A real per capita poverty
line z of 360 Tunisian Dinars per year (roughly equal to the often-used US$1-a-
day line) is used. As in Duclos and Lambert (2000), we identify the post-policy
distribution of pre-policy equals using a non-parametric estimation of the joint
distribution of pre-policy and post-policy incomes.
Table 1 shows the estimates of the poverty effectiveness measures following
this hypothetical reform. Brieﬂy, the impact of regional targeting of transfers
would be more variable horizontally than that of the current system of commodity
targeting, as shown here by H®(z) for ® = 2;3. But although the HE viola-
tions which would arise with this hypothetical reform would certainly reduce its
poverty impact, they would not be considered enough here to offset its higher
3 Details about this program can be found in Tuck and Lindert (1996).
4When the minimization of P®(g(z)) at the national level is the policymaker’s objective, the
available budget should be allocated such as to equalize the P®¡1(gj(z)) of each region j to a
common value. Our regional targeting scheme thus works as follows. Transfers are ﬁrst awarded
to everyone living in the poorest region such as to equalize the region’s P®¡1(gj(z)) to that of the
next poorest region. Transfers are then awarded to each person living in these two poorest regions
such as to equalize their P®¡1(gj(z)) to that of the third poorest region. This pattern is repeated
until the entire available budget is spent.
6vertical effect (as shown by V®(z)) and lower rate of leakage (shown by L(z))).
Overall, therefore, E®(z) is larger for regional targeting. This also serves to show
how this paper’s decomposition methodology can be useful for understanding and
optimizing the poverty impact of poverty alleviation schemes.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that by (10) we have
C
¤i






®(z)) = Γ®(gi(z)) and adding and subtracting Γ1(gi(z)) on the
right-hand side of (14), we ﬁnd
C
¤i





Since the VE of change i is given by
V
i
®(z) = C®(z) ¡ C
¤i
® (z); (16)








The proof of Theorem 1 follows from substituting (17) into (6).
8Table 1: Poverty effectiveness of two types of targeting in Tunisia (in 1990
Tunisian Dinars)
Benchmark Commodity targeting Regional targeting
½i 0 34.79 34.79
Γ1(gi(z)) 35.64 28.33 23.41
Li(z) - 27.48 22.56
Ei
1(z) - 7.31 12.23
Γ2(gi(z)) 75.55 65.36 55.19
Hi
2(z) 0 0.28 1.53
V i
2(z) - 3.16 9.65
Ei
2(z) - 10.19 20.35
Γ3(gi(z)) 102.37 91.47 78.13
Hi
3(z) 0 0.51 2.70
V i
3(z) - 4.10 14.71
Ei
3(z) - 10.89 24.23
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